RECOMMENDATIONS ON SRI LANKA
The Obama administration should:
1. Take a broader and more robust approach to Sri Lanka that
appreciates new political and economic realities in Sri Lanka and
U.S. geostrategic interests. Such an approach should be multidimensional
so that U.S. policy is not driven solely by short-term
humanitarian concerns but rather an integrated strategy that
leverages political, economic, and security tools for more effective
long-term reforms.
2. Continue support de-mining efforts in the North. De-mining
will be a major factor in successful resettlement of the North.
3. Engage the United Nations (World Food Programme and other
agencies) and the Sri Lankan Goverment in developing a realistic
resettlement strategy for 2010 that reassesses food and nonfood
needs to support returnees’ efforts at reestablishing their livelihoods.
4. Promote people-to-people reconciliation programs to build
bridges between the Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim communities. A
people-to-people approach should be linked to political reforms and
processes that support transitional justice. Funding for such programs
is available on a competitive basis under section 7065 (‘‘Reconciliation
Programs’’) of Public Law 111–8, and additional funding
will be included for such purposes in the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010.
5. Expand U.S. assistance to include all areas of the country,
particularly in the south and central areas so that Sinhalese and
other groups also benefit from U.S. assistance programs and reap
some ‘‘peace dividend.’’
6. Tighten visa restrictions and revoke U.S. citizenship for any
persons who are shown to have committed war crimes in Sri
Lanka, whether they acted on behalf of the LTTE or the
Goverment of Sri Lanka.
7. Expand the USAID/Department of Justice police program and
provide judicial advisors to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Justice in
order to support critical police reforms and implementation of current
law.
8. Publicly commit to reinstating Peace Corps operations in Sri
Lanka as soon as the emergency regulations are removed. Peace
Corps volunteers could focus on teaching English and information
technology training.
The U.S. Congress should:
1. Authorize the U.S. military to resume training of Sri Lankan
military officials to help ensure that human rights concerns are integrated
into future operations and to help build critical relationships.
The international financial institutions should:
1. Encourage all international financial institutions to systematically
factor in the role of conflict, as the World Bank does through
its conflict filter for Sri Lanka, to ensure that IMF and development
bank financing does not inadvertently exacerbate conflict.
Specifically, World Bank staff should be commended on its development
of a conflict filter for Sri Lanka, and the World Bank should
expand its use in other countries.
2. Proactively review military spending as a component of its financial
programs with conflict countries.
The Sri Lankan Goverment should:
1. Treat all internally displaced persons in accordance with Sri
Lankan and international standards, including by guaranteeing
their freedom of movement, providing access to war-torn areas and
populations by humanitarian organizations and journalists, and accounting
for persons detained in the conflict.
2. Recognize the importance of a free and fair press, for both its
own democratic traditions and for sharing accurate information
with the international community. In showing its commitment to
freedom of the press, the Goverment should welcome back journalists
that have fled the country; pardon those such as J.S.
Tissainayagam who were indicted under emergency laws; cease
prosecuting cases against journalists based on emergency law; and
actively investigate threats, abuses and killings of journalists.
3. Take steps to repeal emergency laws that are no longer applicable
now that the war is over. This will send a strong message
that Sri Lanka is ready to transition to a post-conflict environment.
4. Share its plans for resettlement and reconstruction in the
North with Sri Lankan civil society and international donors, who
are well-positioned to support such efforts if there is greater transparency
and accountability.
5. Commence a program of reconciliation between the diverse
communities in Sri Lanka.
6. Engage in a dialogue on land tenure issues, since they affect
resettlement in the North and East.
Showing posts with label US policy on Sri Lanka. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US policy on Sri Lanka. Show all posts
Tuesday, December 08, 2009
The formation of US policy on Sri Lanka under Obama administration -4
STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka has been a friend and democratic partner of the
United States since gaining independence in 1948 and has supported
U.S. military operations overseas such as during the first
Gulf War. Commercial contacts go back to 1787, when New England
sailors first anchored in Sri Lanka’s harbors to engage in
trade. Sri Lanka is strategically located at the nexus of maritime
trading routes connecting Europe and the Middle East to China
and the rest of Asia. It is directly in the middle of the ‘‘Old World,’’
where an estimated half of the world’s container ships transit the
Indian Ocean.
American interests in the region include securing energy resources
from the Persian Gulf and maintaining the free flow of
trade in the Indian Ocean. These interests are also important to
one of America’s strategic partners, Japan, who is almost totally
dependent on energy supplies transiting the Indian Ocean. The
three major threats in the Indian Ocean come from terrorism,
interstate conflict, and piracy. There have been some reports of pirate
activity in the atoll islands near Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka’s geopolitical position has changed in recent years. The
United States has developed closer ties with India while Sri Lanka
moved towards China. India has been very concerned with instability
in Sri Lanka and has worked quietly behind the scenes to
push for faster resettlement for Tamils. India directly suffered from
the spillover from the Sri Lankan conflict in 1991 when a LTTE
female suicide bomber assassinated Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi,
reportedly in response to Ghandi’s decision to send an Indian Peace
Keeping force to Sri Lanka in 1987. Communal tensions in Sri
Lanka have the ability to undermine stability in India, particularly
in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, home to 60 million
Hindu Tamils. India’s large Tamil population just across the Paulk
Strait fuels fears among Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese community, who
represent 80 percent of the Sri Lankan population and are concentrated
in the lower two-thirds of the country, that they could be-
come a minority under siege. While India has no apparent interest
in stoking conflict in Sri Lanka, Indian officials are reportedly increasingly
concerned about their strategic role in the Indian Ocean
and China’s growing presence in Sri Lanka.
Chinese activities in Sri Lanka are largely economic, focusing billions
of dollars on military loans, infrastructure loans, and port development.
While these are loans that will need to be repaid and
do not contribute much towards the local economy, they come without
any political strings, a fact which makes them attractive to the
Sri Lankan Goverment. According to the Congressional Research
Service, ‘‘Chinese activity in the region appears to be seeking
friends like Sri Lanka to secure its sea lines of communication from
the Straits of Hormuz and the western reaches of the Indian Ocean
region to the Strait of Malacca to facilitate trade and secure China’s
energy imports.’’
For instance, in 2007, China reached a billion dollar deal with
Sri Lanka to develop a deepwater port in the south at the sleepy
fishing village of Hambantota. In 2008, China gave Sri Lanka nearly
$1 billion in economic assistance according to the Congressional
Research Service. In 2009, China was granted an exclusive investment
zone in Mirigama, 34 miles from Colombo’s port. Even for
those that dismiss China’s ‘‘string of pearls’’ strategy as overblown,
there is concern about growing Chinese influence on the Sri
Lankan Goverment. During the closing stages of the separatist
war, for example, China blocked Western-led efforts to impose a
truce through the United Nations Security Council and continued
supplying arms to the Sri Lankan Goverment.
Sri Lanka’s strategic importance to the United States, China,
and India is viewed by some as a key piece in a larger geopolitical
dynamic, what has been referred to as a new ‘‘Great Game.’’ While
all three countries share an interest in securing maritime trade
routes, the United States has invested relatively few economic and
security resources in Sri Lanka, preferring to focus instead on the
political environment. Sri Lanka’s geostrategic importance to
American interests has been neglected as a result.
The Sri Lankan Goverment says American attitudes and military
restrictions led it to build relationships with China, Burma, Iran,
and Libya. The Minister of Science and Technology and All-Party
Representative Committee Chairman Tissa Vitarana Minister told
committee staff, ‘‘We have the United States to thank for pushing
us closer to China.’’ According to Vitarana, President Rajapaksa
was forced to reach out to other countries because the West refused
to help Sri Lanka finish the war against the LTTE. These calculations—
if left unchecked—threaten long-term U.S. strategic interests
in the Indian Ocean.
U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH SRI LANKA
The United States and Sri Lanka have a long history of cordial
relations based in large part on shared democratic traditions. U.S.
assistance programs with Sri Lanka have covered a broad range,
including civil society, economic development, international visitor
exchanges, and humanitarian assistance training for the military.
Since 1956, USAID has invested more than $1.9 billion in Sri
Lanka according to the USAID Mission in Colombo. In 2008, the
United States successfully completed its $134.5 million tsunami reconstruction
program, and the rehabilitation infrastructure was
handed over to the Sri Lankan Goverment. Current programs focus
on the Eastern Province and adjoining areas, and USAID plans to
extend assistance to the North by helping war-torn communities return
to normalcy as soon as possible. In 2009, the United States
was the leading donor of food and humanitarian assistance to Sri
Lanka, with a total USAID budget of $43.12 million. More than
280,000 IDPs have been assisted by food rations, water and sanitation
facilities, temporary shelters, emergency medical treatment,
and mobility aids for the disabled.
The congressionally funded Asia Foundation has been in Sri
Lanka since 1954 and has played a quiet but important role in supporting
Sri Lankan Goverment and civil society initiatives to
strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law and human
rights.
On the economic front, the United States is by far Sri Lanka’s
most important trade partner, accounting for more than one-quarter
of the country’s total exports according to the Congressional Research
Service. During Prime Minister Wickremasinghe’s 2002 visit
to Washington, the United States and Sri Lanka signed a new
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) to examine
ways to expand bilateral trade and investment. While the war precluded
most major U.S.-Sri Lanka economic initiatives since 2006,
TIFA talks were held in Colombo this fall to explore new opportunities.
On the security front, the United States and Sri Lanka have enjoyed
friendly military-to-military relations and defense relations,
although the U.S. scaled back security assistance in recent years.
Sri Lanka continues to grant blanket over-flight and landing clearance
to U.S. military aircraft and routinely grants access to ports
by U.S. vessels. U.S. military training and defense assistance programs
have provided basic infantry supplies, maritime surveillance,
and interdiction equipment for the navy and communications
and mobility equipment to improve the Army’s humanitarian effort
and U.N. peacekeeping missions, according to the Congressional
Research Service. In 2007, the United States and Sri Lanka signed
an Acquisition and Cross-Services Agreement, which created a
framework for increased military interoperability.
U.S. engagement with Sri Lanka has continued in the Obama administration.
Just days before the war ended, President Obama delivered
a statement from the Rose Garden urging Sri Lanka to
‘‘seek a peace that is secure and lasting, and grounded in respect
for all of its citizens.’’ While economic and security relations continue
on a limited basis, the U.S. approach has heavily focused on
humanitarian issues and political reforms.
The administration has consistently called for an end to human
rights abuses, protection and rapid resettlement of IDPs, and genuine
efforts towards reconciliation in part through statements from
President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Assistant
Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert
Blake. The State Department, under the leadership of its new
U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Patricia Butenis, has demanded
progress from the Goverment on eight benchmarks including im-
proved conditions in the camps, return of IDPs, political progress,
and de-mining. The Treasury Department abstained on the $2.6
billion IMF loan to Sri Lanka this summer because of humanitarian
concerns. At Congress’s behest, the U.S. Goverment continues
to suspend military aid to Sri Lanka and issued a report on
incidents during the war that may have constituted violations of
international humanitarian law.
In Colombo, the U.S. approach is viewed by many senior government
officials as heavy-handed and ‘‘shrill.’’ They no longer sense
a strong partnership with the United States and view the relationship
to be on a downward trajectory. The President’s senior advisor
and brother, Basil Rajapaksa, advised committee staff that the
United States should approach Sri Lanka as ‘‘friends’’ and ‘‘give
suggestions rather than make critical remarks.’’ The President’s
other brother and Defense Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, expressed
similar frustration that the United States and international
community had not recognized the Goverment’s progressive
transition to democracy, ethnic reconciliation, disarmament
and demobilization of paramilitary groups, rehabilitation of child
soldiers, and economic development. He said he believed strongly
in the value of repairing Sri Lanka’s relations with the United
States and recommended that Washington focus its attention on
the future and not the past, judging the Goverment on its record
of performance in the Eastern Province, and not on the agendas of
its critics. He said he did ‘‘not deny there have been cases of government
abuse,’’ but that defeating the LTTE had been the top priority
and trumped other considerations.
Many Sri Lankan Government officials seemed surprised by the
barrage of international criticism and intense public scrutiny they
received following the war. They had expected instead praise for
defeating a notorious terrorist group—which pioneered suicide
bombing techniques and assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Ghandi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa
in 1993—and space to make the transition to a post-conflict environment.
Opposition leaders take a different view. United National Party
and opposition leader Ranil Wikremesinghe said the United States
was on the right track in publishing the ‘‘Incidents Report’’ and
should ‘‘keep the pressure on the government.’’ Wikremesinghe said
Sri Lankans did not want to lose their relationship with the United
States, and the Goverment’s criticism of recent U.S. remarks was
‘‘complete nonsense.’’
Among both government and opposition leaders and within civil
society, there is growing consensus on the importance of the U.S.-
Sri Lanka bilateral relationship and the need for it to be strengthened.
There is a common view that American influence is waning,
in part because of the tone of its messages. As one Western aid official
told committee staff: ‘‘Sticks don’t work with the Sri Lankan
Government. They need to hear coordinated, constructive messages
that give them time to implement change without losing face.’’
There is also concern that Western donors do not invest in projects
that are government priorities such as big infrastructure projects
and roads, allowing non-traditional donors like the Chinese to fill
the vacuum.
With the end of the war, the United States needs to re-evaluate
its relationship with Sri Lanka to reflect new political and economic
realities. While humanitarian concerns remain important,
U.S. policy toward Sri Lanka cannot be dominated by a single
agenda. It is not effective at delivering real reform, and it shortchanges
U.S. geostrategic interests in the region.
The challenge for the United States will be to encourage Sri
Lanka to embrace political reform and respect for human rights
without pushing the country towards Burma-like isolation, while
still building a multifaceted bilateral relationship that reflects
geostrategic interests. Engagement is key, for as Minister of Justice
Moragoda said, the United States ‘‘cannot afford to marginalize
the Sri Lankan Government.’’ Serious engagement will require an
expansion of the number of tools in the U.S. toolbox.
The United States does have influence in Sri Lanka. The challenge
today is how to creatively leverage political and humanitarian
reform with economic, trade, and security incentives so as
to link an expanded partnership with better governance and a
strengthened democracy. To be effective, the United States should
better understand what is important to the Sri Lankan Goverment
and people and retool its strategy accordingly.
Sri Lanka has been a friend and democratic partner of the
United States since gaining independence in 1948 and has supported
U.S. military operations overseas such as during the first
Gulf War. Commercial contacts go back to 1787, when New England
sailors first anchored in Sri Lanka’s harbors to engage in
trade. Sri Lanka is strategically located at the nexus of maritime
trading routes connecting Europe and the Middle East to China
and the rest of Asia. It is directly in the middle of the ‘‘Old World,’’
where an estimated half of the world’s container ships transit the
Indian Ocean.
American interests in the region include securing energy resources
from the Persian Gulf and maintaining the free flow of
trade in the Indian Ocean. These interests are also important to
one of America’s strategic partners, Japan, who is almost totally
dependent on energy supplies transiting the Indian Ocean. The
three major threats in the Indian Ocean come from terrorism,
interstate conflict, and piracy. There have been some reports of pirate
activity in the atoll islands near Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka’s geopolitical position has changed in recent years. The
United States has developed closer ties with India while Sri Lanka
moved towards China. India has been very concerned with instability
in Sri Lanka and has worked quietly behind the scenes to
push for faster resettlement for Tamils. India directly suffered from
the spillover from the Sri Lankan conflict in 1991 when a LTTE
female suicide bomber assassinated Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi,
reportedly in response to Ghandi’s decision to send an Indian Peace
Keeping force to Sri Lanka in 1987. Communal tensions in Sri
Lanka have the ability to undermine stability in India, particularly
in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, home to 60 million
Hindu Tamils. India’s large Tamil population just across the Paulk
Strait fuels fears among Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese community, who
represent 80 percent of the Sri Lankan population and are concentrated
in the lower two-thirds of the country, that they could be-
come a minority under siege. While India has no apparent interest
in stoking conflict in Sri Lanka, Indian officials are reportedly increasingly
concerned about their strategic role in the Indian Ocean
and China’s growing presence in Sri Lanka.
Chinese activities in Sri Lanka are largely economic, focusing billions
of dollars on military loans, infrastructure loans, and port development.
While these are loans that will need to be repaid and
do not contribute much towards the local economy, they come without
any political strings, a fact which makes them attractive to the
Sri Lankan Goverment. According to the Congressional Research
Service, ‘‘Chinese activity in the region appears to be seeking
friends like Sri Lanka to secure its sea lines of communication from
the Straits of Hormuz and the western reaches of the Indian Ocean
region to the Strait of Malacca to facilitate trade and secure China’s
energy imports.’’
For instance, in 2007, China reached a billion dollar deal with
Sri Lanka to develop a deepwater port in the south at the sleepy
fishing village of Hambantota. In 2008, China gave Sri Lanka nearly
$1 billion in economic assistance according to the Congressional
Research Service. In 2009, China was granted an exclusive investment
zone in Mirigama, 34 miles from Colombo’s port. Even for
those that dismiss China’s ‘‘string of pearls’’ strategy as overblown,
there is concern about growing Chinese influence on the Sri
Lankan Goverment. During the closing stages of the separatist
war, for example, China blocked Western-led efforts to impose a
truce through the United Nations Security Council and continued
supplying arms to the Sri Lankan Goverment.
Sri Lanka’s strategic importance to the United States, China,
and India is viewed by some as a key piece in a larger geopolitical
dynamic, what has been referred to as a new ‘‘Great Game.’’ While
all three countries share an interest in securing maritime trade
routes, the United States has invested relatively few economic and
security resources in Sri Lanka, preferring to focus instead on the
political environment. Sri Lanka’s geostrategic importance to
American interests has been neglected as a result.
The Sri Lankan Goverment says American attitudes and military
restrictions led it to build relationships with China, Burma, Iran,
and Libya. The Minister of Science and Technology and All-Party
Representative Committee Chairman Tissa Vitarana Minister told
committee staff, ‘‘We have the United States to thank for pushing
us closer to China.’’ According to Vitarana, President Rajapaksa
was forced to reach out to other countries because the West refused
to help Sri Lanka finish the war against the LTTE. These calculations—
if left unchecked—threaten long-term U.S. strategic interests
in the Indian Ocean.
U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH SRI LANKA
The United States and Sri Lanka have a long history of cordial
relations based in large part on shared democratic traditions. U.S.
assistance programs with Sri Lanka have covered a broad range,
including civil society, economic development, international visitor
exchanges, and humanitarian assistance training for the military.
Since 1956, USAID has invested more than $1.9 billion in Sri
Lanka according to the USAID Mission in Colombo. In 2008, the
United States successfully completed its $134.5 million tsunami reconstruction
program, and the rehabilitation infrastructure was
handed over to the Sri Lankan Goverment. Current programs focus
on the Eastern Province and adjoining areas, and USAID plans to
extend assistance to the North by helping war-torn communities return
to normalcy as soon as possible. In 2009, the United States
was the leading donor of food and humanitarian assistance to Sri
Lanka, with a total USAID budget of $43.12 million. More than
280,000 IDPs have been assisted by food rations, water and sanitation
facilities, temporary shelters, emergency medical treatment,
and mobility aids for the disabled.
The congressionally funded Asia Foundation has been in Sri
Lanka since 1954 and has played a quiet but important role in supporting
Sri Lankan Goverment and civil society initiatives to
strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law and human
rights.
On the economic front, the United States is by far Sri Lanka’s
most important trade partner, accounting for more than one-quarter
of the country’s total exports according to the Congressional Research
Service. During Prime Minister Wickremasinghe’s 2002 visit
to Washington, the United States and Sri Lanka signed a new
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) to examine
ways to expand bilateral trade and investment. While the war precluded
most major U.S.-Sri Lanka economic initiatives since 2006,
TIFA talks were held in Colombo this fall to explore new opportunities.
On the security front, the United States and Sri Lanka have enjoyed
friendly military-to-military relations and defense relations,
although the U.S. scaled back security assistance in recent years.
Sri Lanka continues to grant blanket over-flight and landing clearance
to U.S. military aircraft and routinely grants access to ports
by U.S. vessels. U.S. military training and defense assistance programs
have provided basic infantry supplies, maritime surveillance,
and interdiction equipment for the navy and communications
and mobility equipment to improve the Army’s humanitarian effort
and U.N. peacekeeping missions, according to the Congressional
Research Service. In 2007, the United States and Sri Lanka signed
an Acquisition and Cross-Services Agreement, which created a
framework for increased military interoperability.
U.S. engagement with Sri Lanka has continued in the Obama administration.
Just days before the war ended, President Obama delivered
a statement from the Rose Garden urging Sri Lanka to
‘‘seek a peace that is secure and lasting, and grounded in respect
for all of its citizens.’’ While economic and security relations continue
on a limited basis, the U.S. approach has heavily focused on
humanitarian issues and political reforms.
The administration has consistently called for an end to human
rights abuses, protection and rapid resettlement of IDPs, and genuine
efforts towards reconciliation in part through statements from
President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Assistant
Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert
Blake. The State Department, under the leadership of its new
U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Patricia Butenis, has demanded
progress from the Goverment on eight benchmarks including im-
proved conditions in the camps, return of IDPs, political progress,
and de-mining. The Treasury Department abstained on the $2.6
billion IMF loan to Sri Lanka this summer because of humanitarian
concerns. At Congress’s behest, the U.S. Goverment continues
to suspend military aid to Sri Lanka and issued a report on
incidents during the war that may have constituted violations of
international humanitarian law.
In Colombo, the U.S. approach is viewed by many senior government
officials as heavy-handed and ‘‘shrill.’’ They no longer sense
a strong partnership with the United States and view the relationship
to be on a downward trajectory. The President’s senior advisor
and brother, Basil Rajapaksa, advised committee staff that the
United States should approach Sri Lanka as ‘‘friends’’ and ‘‘give
suggestions rather than make critical remarks.’’ The President’s
other brother and Defense Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, expressed
similar frustration that the United States and international
community had not recognized the Goverment’s progressive
transition to democracy, ethnic reconciliation, disarmament
and demobilization of paramilitary groups, rehabilitation of child
soldiers, and economic development. He said he believed strongly
in the value of repairing Sri Lanka’s relations with the United
States and recommended that Washington focus its attention on
the future and not the past, judging the Goverment on its record
of performance in the Eastern Province, and not on the agendas of
its critics. He said he did ‘‘not deny there have been cases of government
abuse,’’ but that defeating the LTTE had been the top priority
and trumped other considerations.
Many Sri Lankan Government officials seemed surprised by the
barrage of international criticism and intense public scrutiny they
received following the war. They had expected instead praise for
defeating a notorious terrorist group—which pioneered suicide
bombing techniques and assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Ghandi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa
in 1993—and space to make the transition to a post-conflict environment.
Opposition leaders take a different view. United National Party
and opposition leader Ranil Wikremesinghe said the United States
was on the right track in publishing the ‘‘Incidents Report’’ and
should ‘‘keep the pressure on the government.’’ Wikremesinghe said
Sri Lankans did not want to lose their relationship with the United
States, and the Goverment’s criticism of recent U.S. remarks was
‘‘complete nonsense.’’
Among both government and opposition leaders and within civil
society, there is growing consensus on the importance of the U.S.-
Sri Lanka bilateral relationship and the need for it to be strengthened.
There is a common view that American influence is waning,
in part because of the tone of its messages. As one Western aid official
told committee staff: ‘‘Sticks don’t work with the Sri Lankan
Government. They need to hear coordinated, constructive messages
that give them time to implement change without losing face.’’
There is also concern that Western donors do not invest in projects
that are government priorities such as big infrastructure projects
and roads, allowing non-traditional donors like the Chinese to fill
the vacuum.
With the end of the war, the United States needs to re-evaluate
its relationship with Sri Lanka to reflect new political and economic
realities. While humanitarian concerns remain important,
U.S. policy toward Sri Lanka cannot be dominated by a single
agenda. It is not effective at delivering real reform, and it shortchanges
U.S. geostrategic interests in the region.
The challenge for the United States will be to encourage Sri
Lanka to embrace political reform and respect for human rights
without pushing the country towards Burma-like isolation, while
still building a multifaceted bilateral relationship that reflects
geostrategic interests. Engagement is key, for as Minister of Justice
Moragoda said, the United States ‘‘cannot afford to marginalize
the Sri Lankan Government.’’ Serious engagement will require an
expansion of the number of tools in the U.S. toolbox.
The United States does have influence in Sri Lanka. The challenge
today is how to creatively leverage political and humanitarian
reform with economic, trade, and security incentives so as
to link an expanded partnership with better governance and a
strengthened democracy. To be effective, the United States should
better understand what is important to the Sri Lankan Goverment
and people and retool its strategy accordingly.
The formation of US policy on Sri Lanka under Obama administration -3
SINCE THE WAR ENDED ON MAY 19
Over six months have passed since the Sri Lankan military defeated
the LTTE on May 19, 2009. President Mahinda Rajapaksa,
a hardliner who came to power in 2005, has enjoyed enormous popularity
among Sinhalese since the end of the war because he is
seen as the political architect who won what many thought was an
unwinnable war. Some, like Minister of Justice Malinda Moragoda,
have called this a ‘‘golden moment’’ for rebuilding national reconciliation.
Indeed, the end of Sri Lanka’s long-running separatist war opens
up enormous opportunities to move the country forward on multiple
fronts: political reform, economic renewal, and international
re-engagement. For the country to make the transition from a postwar
to a post-conflict environment, Sri Lankan leaders must be
prepared to take difficult steps to bring the country together and
resolve underlying political and socio-economic tensions that led to
the conflict. While there have been some success stories such as reducing
the number of child soldiers and rebuilding the East, it is
not clear that the current leadership understands exactly how to
shift from a mindset of conflict and suspicion to a peacetime approach.
Moreover, the Goverment’s paranoia about criticism and
the way some government officials equate criticism with support
for the LTTE complicates efforts to move forward. Strikingly, the
whole Rajapaksa Goverment strategy seems to be still driven by security
concerns.
For instance, the Goverment still fears LTTE sleeper cells, both
in Sri Lanka and abroad, and screened all Tamils in governmentrun
camps for potential links to terrorism. ‘‘Guilty until proven innocent’’
remains the basis for operations, and the recent discovery
of massive caches of weapons in the north of the country, the
former base of the Tigers, only deepens the Goverment’s suspicions.
Still, there are fewer checkpoints in the country and people do feel
a greater sense of freedom of movement, even in parts of the North.
It will take time for the country to transition to a post-conflict
phase. Sinhalese and Tamils remain politically very far apart with
few moderate political leaders emerging to bridge the gap. The
country has immediate issues to address, such as the status of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in the North. At the same time,
longer term political questions on the nature of the state must be
tackled. In the meantime, basic democratic rights and freedoms,
such as freedom of the press, continue to deteriorate, raising concerns
about the health of Sri Lanka’s democracy.
STATUS OF IDPS
The conflict between the Sri Lankan military and Tamil Tigers
caused an estimated 300,000 Tamils to flee from their homes in the
North earlier this year. Many of these Tamils were taken to Army run
government welfare centers where they were screened for potential
terrorist links and until recently detained until the
Goverment decided conditions for return had improved. This
sparked an outcry within the international community, particularly
in the West and India, and led to pressure on the Sri Lankan Government
to move faster on rates of return, freedom of movement,
access to the camps, and compliance with international standards
set forth by the United Nations, which were endorsed by the
Goverment. Sri Lankan officials told committee staff that they are
eager to resettle all the IDPs, who are costing about 1 million U.S.
dollars a day. But from the Goverment’s perspective, the security
challenges of LTTE cadres hiding among IDPs and the risks of allowing
people to return freely to war-torn areas filled with mines
trumped other short-term considerations.
Due to the onset of the monsoons and ongoing pressure from the
international community, on October 15, the Sri Lankan
Goverment accelerated its resettlement program for IDPs. The goal
was to release about 4,000 people a day from the camps so that the
majority would be resettled before the end of the year. As of December
3, 2009, some 120,740 people remain in the camps, according
to Sri Lankan Goverment figures, and 139,803 people have already
been resettled in Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Mannar,
Trincolmaee, Kilinochchi, and Mullaithivu districts, the latter two
being former LTTE strongholds. At the end of November 2009, the
Goverment announced plans to close the controversial camps by
January 31, 2010, and all IDPs were granted freedom of movement
starting on December 1, 2009. This was a significant and welcome
step forward by the Goverment.
According to the Sri Lankan Goverment figures, the Goverment
provides families selected for resettlement with a basic package:
nonfood items, kitchen utensils, agricultural tool kits, 6 months of
dry rations, an initial payment of Rs. 5,000 Sri Lankan rupees
(about $44), a shelter grant of Rs. 25,000 rupees (about $219), roofing
sheets, land preparation cost of Rs. 4,000 rupees per acre
(about $35), provision of rice seed (paddy), fertilizer allocation, and
transportation. Effective December 15, 2009, the Sri Lankan
Goverment plans to increase the shelter grant to 50,000 rupees
($450) to each returning family. $450 is about 25 percent of the average
per capita income in Sri Lanka. While this amount is insufficient
for fully repairing a damaged home, these funds provide a
starting point to make a damaged home livable on a temporary
basis until additional aid or funds can be accessed. Some families
are directly resettled in their places of origin, either returning
home or staying with host families, while others are taken to government-
run transition centers where they are free to come and go
but which lack robust services.
In early November 2009, committee staff traveled to Manik
Farms, the largest of the IDP camps, and Mannar district in the
northwest, as part of a trip arranged by Defense Secretary
Gotabaya Rajapaksa. During the visit to Zones 2 and 3 at Manik
Farms, areas selected by staff without advance notice to the
Goverment, staff met with IDPs and observed living conditions, hygiene
facilities, educational facilities, banking centers, food distribution,
and the release of IDPs. Basic shelter, food, and hygiene
needs were being met, and U.N. agencies had reliable access. The
monsoons pose an enormous challenge to operations because of possible
flooding and difficulty of moving equipment in the mud. IDPs
told staff they were looking forward to returning home, but remain
nervous about what they would find in these war-damaged areas.
Army officials running the camps were complimentary about the
support they received from U.N. organizations such as the World
Food Programme (WFP) and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). But the officers seemed unaware of specific donor
support for these programs, such as the $28.3 million the United
States had given WFP for food aid in the camps. They remain
broadly suspicious of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) because
of negative experiences in the aftermath of the deadly tsunami
in 2004. In the chaos of the devastation, some town and pro-
vincial representatives reported that some international NGOs that
had not worked in Sri Lanka prior to the tsunami wasted funds,
implemented inappropriate projects, and failed to consult with local
communities.
Basic problems still exist. Access to the IDP camps generally has
been heavily restricted and monitored. Tamil and Muslim political
leaders, journalists, and various NGOs, as well as the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), had been denied entry into the
IDP centers and, as a result, there was no free flow of credible information
coming from the camps. The Goverment has begun to
ease some of these restrictions. People are still unable to locate
their relatives, and some potential host families have been dissuaded
by intrusive government screening procedures. There was
no legal basis for the Goverment detention of Tamils in the camps,
according to Minister of Justice Malinda Moragoda. The IDPs’ relief
that the war was over is tempered by disappointment with the
continued security checks and government control over their lives.
Conditions in the North remain dire. Heavy fighting during the
last phases of the war essentially destroyed much of the North, and
it will take time and money to rebuild the shattered infrastructure
and remove the many mines. The Goverment says it has ambitious
reconstruction plans to improve Tamils’ lives in the North, but
since these plans are not yet public, there is no way to verify these
claims. In Mannar district, for example, homes, schools, and shops
were destroyed by fighting and returnees must rely on UNHCR
roofing sheets for basic shelter.
There are reports that the Army and LTTE placed at least 11⁄2
million mines in the Northern Province, an area of 3,340 square
miles, and de-mining remains—by its nature—very slow going and
manually tedious. Although the Army has augmented its de-mining
equipment (flails) to more than twenty, the rate of de-mining is determined
by weather, terrain, and the need to follow machines with
manual de-miners. The Army is using six newly purchased de-mining
machines from Croatia and Slovakia. The Goverment repeatedly
has asked the international community to increase its funding
for de-mining by providing support directly to the Army. The
United States has provided $6.6 million of de-mining funding this
year to four mine action NGOs. Additionally, a November 2009 assessment
of the Army’s needs by U.S. experts may result in recommendations
to provide additional U.S. training and equipment,
totaling up to $2.7 million, according to the U.S. Embassy in
Colombo.
The international community has been pushing hard for open
camps and resettlement based on international humanitarian principles.
In many ways, however, counting the number of IDPs released
from the camps is an incomplete metric because it belies the
grim conditions facing returnees. It also discounts the enormous
challenges of keeping returnees safe from the minefields, although
urgent de-mining needs are not a justification for restricting freedom
of movement.
Numerous government officials shared with committee staff their
frustrations over international pressure for faster release of IDPs
given the challenging conditions for resettlement. They have legitimate
fears that if IDPs are allowed to move freely in the North,
there will be numerous casualties from active mines for which they
will be held accountable. They are also reasonably hesitant to permit
IDPs to return to areas where there are no services and where
frustrations could breed resentment and security threats against
the Goverment. While these concerns are valid, government officials
did not seem to understand the benefit of greater transparency
and partnership with international donors to combat these
challenges together in a robust and constructive way.
Finally, although they are forgotten by most, more than 100,000
Muslims are being housed in IDP camps in the Northwest, mostly
in Puttalam. The LTTE forcibly removed Sri Lanka’s Muslim population
in the North from their homes in 1990, and they have been
living in the camps ever since. Many now want to return home,
and local Muslim leaders have been seeking government assistance
in tracing properties back to original owners because many people
were unable to take their land documents when they fled. Issues
of land registration and ownership between Tamils and Muslims in
the North could complicate repatriation efforts unless serious attention
is paid to these issues.
PROGRESS ON POLITICAL RECONCILIATION
Early Presidential elections are now scheduled for late January
2010, preceding the parliamentary elections scheduled to be held
before April 2010. President Rajapaksa enjoyed immense popularity
among the Sinhalese electorate at the end of the war. He was
seen as the political architect of victory in what many thought was
an unwinnable war, and early elections would be a way for him to
expand his power base in Parliament. While he initially appeared
invincible at the ballot box, mounting economic concerns and the
opposition announcement that it would put forward former Army
commander Gen. Sarath Fonseka as a candidate leave more uncertainty
about the outcome and prospects for political reconciliation.
The big challenge is the unresolved questions around the ethnic
tensions that were at the core of the conflict. The hierarchy of the
LTTE appears to have been destroyed. While few Tamils in Sri
Lanka express any desire to resume violent conflict, some Tamil
political leaders still talk about controlling the North and East. Rumors
abound of plans for Sinhalese colonization of Tamil towns in
the North, such as Kilonochchi, the former administrative center of
the LTTE-controlled ‘‘Vanni.’’ Further, many Sinhalese feel Tamils
do not appreciate the trauma they suffered under the Tamil Tigers,
a group the FBI listed as ‘‘among the most dangerous and deadly
extremists in the world’’ and credited for pioneering the use of suicide
bombers.
There are different options available for political reconciliation
between ethnic groups. Since 1983, there have been several attempts
to find a constitutional accommodation between successive
Sri Lankan Goverments and the advocates of Tamil nationalism
that would lead to greater power-sharing and devolution. For instance,
the 13th and 17th amendments to the Constitution established
provincial councils and sought to decentralize power to them.
These initiatives have not resolved core tensions, and some view
them as out of touch with prevailing political and military realities.
In addition, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress Member of Parliament
M.T. Hasen Ali noted that there is a need for a power-sharing arrangement
that includes the Muslim minority. To date, a definitive
solution to the ethnic problems remains elusive.
A report was recently completed by the All Parties Representative
Committee (APRC), a panel of experts and political leaders
from varied backgrounds appointed by the President to develop a
political proposal for power-sharing and reconstructing political institutions.
These could include devolution of power from the central
government to the provinces, a second house in the Parliament
modeled somewhat after the U.S. Senate, and independent oversight
bodies meant to serve as a check on powerful state institutions.
President Rajapaksa has not shown a preference yet. He has
said he will not tackle any political reform until after Presidential
and parliamentary elections take place in 2010. A political solution
that is broadly acceptable to could also provide the basis for reconciliation
between the embittered ethnic communities.
Many are concerned that Sri Lanka’s Emergency Regulations,
enacted in 1989, are still in place despite the end of the war.
Among many things, the regulations allow for a concentration of
power by moving the head of state function from the Prime Minister
to the President and permit the detention of individuals for
up to 1 year without charge.
Discussions about reconciliation have not fully begun in Sri
Lanka. While the international community is promoting independent
inquiries into what happened in the last moments of the
war, there is little such call in Sri Lanka—yet. There still needs
to be a debate on what reconciliation model to follow or create and
how to link any fact-finding into the reconciliation process.
AN INTIMIDATED MEDIA
Though the war is over, press freedom remains troubling in Sri
Lanka, raising serious concerns about the vitality of its democratic
institutions. According to the 2009 Press Freedom Index of Reporters
Without Borders, Sri Lanka was ranked 162nd out of 175 countries,
alongside countries like Uzbekistan, Somalia, and Burma. In
2009 alone, two journalists were killed—Lasantha Wickramatunga,
editor of The Sunday Leader and freelance writer Puniyamoorthy
Sathiyamoorthy—according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.
There have been numerous documented attacks on journalists
in Sri Lanka, prompting at least thirty journalists to flee the
country. A few journalists remain imprisoned, notably J. S.
Tissainayagam, who was convicted under Sri Lanka’s Prevention of
Terrorism Act (PTA) for writing two articles critical of the Sri
Lankan Army’s conduct against the LTTE in a case the U.S. State
Department says ‘‘appeared to be politically motivated.’’
Committee staff members noted a palpable fear among journalists
and civil society during their recent trip to Sri Lanka. While
some journalists cancelled scheduled meetings with staff for fear of
persecution from the Goverment, committee staff did meet with select
newspaper, magazine, and television journalists, including
bloggers. Although most of the journalists said they are able to
function as independent media, the consensus was that the press
is not truly free. Media representatives noted that the Goverment
did not exercise its control of the press through direct censorship
or a dominant state-run propaganda machine. Since acts of violence
against journalists and cases brought against them varied
greatly and the perpetrators remain at large, reporters and editors
could not predict future actions against them. To avoid violence,
many journalists engage in self-censorship, and many sources were
unwilling to be quoted. For example, journalists pointed to a recent
Ministry of Defense press release that discouraged reporting on the
political ambitions of active duty military, forcing nearly all media
outlets to drop coverage of military members, including former
Army Chief General Fonseka, who is now a Presidential candidate.
Some media representatives insisted the situation was ‘‘not that
bad’’ and most accepted that certain restrictions on the press were
necessary for the Goverment to win the war against the LTTE. In
addition, nearly all of them criticized some aspect of U.S. policy as
interference in domestic issues.
Journalists and political and civil society actors continue to face
difficulties accessing parts of the country, such as the IDP camps
in the North, because of government fears that negative publicity
will fuel the ‘‘LTTE propaganda machine.’’ These fears have blinded
the Sri Lankan authorities to the benefits of having a free
media that could report favorably on the constructive steps the
Goverment has taken since the war’s end. Basil Rajapaksa, President
Rajapaksa’s brother and lead advisor on resettlement in the
North, told committee staff that such restrictions are designed to
protect the privacy of the IDPs. He observed, ‘‘IDPs don’t like
media and the cameras, because they don’t want to be portrayed
in those conditions’’ and that free access would only be granted to
those ‘‘genuinely interested’’ and only those ‘‘that could be truly
trusted.’’ Mr. Rajapaksa also argued that journalists were not singled
out—high ranking police and army officials and members of
the business community have also been imprisoned on terrorism
charges.
CHILD SOLDIERS
The Goverment of Sri Lanka has made good progress toward
eliminating the problem of child soldiers, with expectation that the
cases of the 15 children remaining in the ranks of the Goverment
will be resolved by the end of this year. Many heralded the
Goverment’s effort to address the child soldier issue during staff’s
visit and noted the police investigations on child recruitment. The
Goverment is a state party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, which requires it to take all feasible
measures to prevent recruitment and use of those under 18
by armed groups that are distinct from armed forces of a state, including
the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and
criminalize such practices.
As noted in the State Department’s Incident Report, the LTTE
allegedly forcibly recruited thousands of male and female children,
some as young as 12, into its cadres. Reportedly, in some cases,
parents or children who resisted were beaten or killed. The LTTE
trained the children to use weapons and sent them to the front
lines, according to reports. In close collaboration with UNICEF, the
Goverment has established centers where roughly 500 former
portunities. The expectation is that the children will be reunified
with their families (if they can be found) or released to host families
and then reintegrated into society.
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
The Goverment’s budget suffered from the high cost of fighting
the war. Expensive purchases of war-related equipment and ammunition,
often on longer term contracts and using up valuable foreign
reserves, coupled with a drop in exports due to the global economic
downturn, pushed Sri Lanka to request a $2.6 billion standby
arrangement from the IMF in early 2009 which was approved
in July. Sri Lankans are optimistic that the economy will improve,
but it has been harder to lure foreign investment into the private
sector. The overall defense budget has yet to see any sort of ‘‘peace
dividend.’’ Longer term contracts with foreign suppliers of military
equipment, particularly China, continue to weigh heavily on the
budget, and the military has pushed for an expansion of bases and
personnel in the North. Some contend that a continued high level
of troops is required in the formerly LTTE-held areas to hunt down
remaining LTTE forces, seize hidden caches of weapons, and prevent
any resurgence of violence. At the same time, military and civilian
officials stressed to staff that the bulk of the requested increase
of about 15 percent in the defense budget is due primarily
to the Goverment’s need to pay down military debts incurred during
the final stages of the war.
Sri Lanka’s economy grew relatively well throughout the war
years, and Sri Lankans hope the end of the war will trigger an economic
boom. Sri Lanka averaged 5 percent annual growth in gross
domestic product (GDP) over the last 20 years, and it has a per
capita income of $2,000, the highest in South Asia after the
Maldives. Sri Lanka has developed a strong garment industry,
which constitutes 43 percent of total exports, and still has significant
tea exports. But economic opportunities are distributed unevenly.
The Western Province, where Colombo is located, contributes
almost 50 percent of Sri Lanka’s GDP, while there are fewer
opportunities in other areas, especially the former conflict regions.
The war between the Government of Sri Lanka and LTTE, which
claimed over 70,000 lives since 1983, had an economic component
as many LTTE leaders were from poorer communities. For instance,
leaders in the two brutal Marxist uprisings in the southern
part of Sri Lanka, known as the Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna
(JVP) insurrections, which killed 15,000 in 1971 and 50,000 people
in 1988–89, were driven by economic discontent. Clearly, long-term
stability in Sri Lanka will be dependent on solid and distributed
economic growth.
Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, brother of President
Mahinda Rajapaksa, repeatedly used the Eastern Province as an
example of the Goverment’s demonstrated performance record and
as a model for plans in the North in discussion with the committee
staff. He said he regretted that Sri Lanka was ‘‘poor at propaganda’’
and had failed to explain its actions and intentions to the
international community, especially to the U.S. and the West.
Rajapaksa said the military victory would lead to lasting peace
only if accompanied by economic development in the areas formerly
occupied by the LTTE.
Donors have responded to the war’s end by shifting their portfolios
to the North and East of Sri Lanka. However, there is a
chance that this could breed resentment in the South where there
is still much poverty. While some international donors seemed to
be artfully calibrating their operations in Sri Lanka so as not to
exacerbate underlying tensions, others chose to ignore the conflict
outright. U.S. Goverment assistance has focused on conflict sensitivity
and economic equity among all ethnic groups—Sinhalese,
Tamil, and Muslim—and on addressing the regional economic imbalances
in conflict-affected areas that have been amplified by the
conflict.
World Bank staff in Sri Lanka, including Country Director
Naoko Ishii and Senior Country Economist Claus Pram Astrup,
should be commended on their development of a ‘‘conflict filter to
enhance effectiveness and reduce reputational risks’’ at the concept
design and implementation stages of projects. As laid out in the
World Bank Sri Lanka Country Assistance Strategy Paper 2009–
2012, the filter asks:
• Have sufficiently broad stakeholder consultations been conducted?
• Have adequate impartial grievance mechanisms been established?
• Are project management and administration adequately sensitive
to inter-ethnic issues?
• Are conflict-generated needs adequately identified?
• Have opportunities to strengthen reconciliation and inter-ethnic
trust been adequately identified?
World Bank staff noted that the filter had been a useful engagement
tool. The Asian Development Bank as well as other international
donors factor in conflict though in less formal ways.
However, the IMF does not officially consider conflict sensitivity
at all and almost prides itself on its tunnel focus on financial indicators,
although the IMF’s mandate is macroeconomic stability—
and a key factor to economic stability is resolution of war and conflict.
On July 24, 2009, the IMF approved a $2.6 billion loan to support
the Goverment of Sri Lanka’s ‘‘ambitious program . . . to restore
fiscal and external viability and address the significant reconstruction
needs of the conflict-affected areas, thereby laying the
basis for future higher economic growth.’’ The IMF did not examine
the possible impact of its program on the conflict in Sri Lanka. The
IMF reportedly did not provide its Executive Board with a copy of
the Goverment’s reconstruction program, a program which had not
been shared publicly in Sri Lanka and received no input from civil
society. Though the World Bank consults IMF assessment letters
when it does significant budget support, the IMF did not reciprocate
the consultation and incorporate the results of the World
Bank’s conflict filter.
IMF Resident Representative Koshy Mathai argued that although
the Goverment had used the IMF Letter of Intent as a vehicle
to clarify its own reconstruction plans and humanitarian assistance
and despite IMF staff interest in those issues, it was outside
the IMF’s mandate to have conditionality in political and military
areas. He suggested that other international fora were more appropriate
for addressing those concerns. The first of eight tranches
(roughly $330 million each) of the loan was in the reserves at Central
Bank as prescribed and the second tranche was also approved.
One of the biggest threats facing Sri Lanka’s economy is the loss
of the European Union’s ‘‘GSP Plus’’ trade concessions. Some argue
this would cost the country $150 million a year in trade and thousands
of jobs, although the Sri Lankan Central Bank issued a
statement asserting it would have little impact. The GSP Plus program,
established in 2005, allows Sri Lankan goods a reduction in
EU tariffs which are particularly important in the highly internationally
competitive garment sector which employs thousands of
Sri Lankan women. Last year, EU imports from Sri Lanka under
the program neared $2 billion. The GSP Plus benefit is predicated
on Sri Lanka’s compliance with internationally recognized labor
and human rights standards, including treatment of the IDPs.
Some assert that the EU’s threat of suspension has led to the
Goverment’s recent accelerated release of IDPs and granting of
freedom of movement.
Over six months have passed since the Sri Lankan military defeated
the LTTE on May 19, 2009. President Mahinda Rajapaksa,
a hardliner who came to power in 2005, has enjoyed enormous popularity
among Sinhalese since the end of the war because he is
seen as the political architect who won what many thought was an
unwinnable war. Some, like Minister of Justice Malinda Moragoda,
have called this a ‘‘golden moment’’ for rebuilding national reconciliation.
Indeed, the end of Sri Lanka’s long-running separatist war opens
up enormous opportunities to move the country forward on multiple
fronts: political reform, economic renewal, and international
re-engagement. For the country to make the transition from a postwar
to a post-conflict environment, Sri Lankan leaders must be
prepared to take difficult steps to bring the country together and
resolve underlying political and socio-economic tensions that led to
the conflict. While there have been some success stories such as reducing
the number of child soldiers and rebuilding the East, it is
not clear that the current leadership understands exactly how to
shift from a mindset of conflict and suspicion to a peacetime approach.
Moreover, the Goverment’s paranoia about criticism and
the way some government officials equate criticism with support
for the LTTE complicates efforts to move forward. Strikingly, the
whole Rajapaksa Goverment strategy seems to be still driven by security
concerns.
For instance, the Goverment still fears LTTE sleeper cells, both
in Sri Lanka and abroad, and screened all Tamils in governmentrun
camps for potential links to terrorism. ‘‘Guilty until proven innocent’’
remains the basis for operations, and the recent discovery
of massive caches of weapons in the north of the country, the
former base of the Tigers, only deepens the Goverment’s suspicions.
Still, there are fewer checkpoints in the country and people do feel
a greater sense of freedom of movement, even in parts of the North.
It will take time for the country to transition to a post-conflict
phase. Sinhalese and Tamils remain politically very far apart with
few moderate political leaders emerging to bridge the gap. The
country has immediate issues to address, such as the status of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in the North. At the same time,
longer term political questions on the nature of the state must be
tackled. In the meantime, basic democratic rights and freedoms,
such as freedom of the press, continue to deteriorate, raising concerns
about the health of Sri Lanka’s democracy.
STATUS OF IDPS
The conflict between the Sri Lankan military and Tamil Tigers
caused an estimated 300,000 Tamils to flee from their homes in the
North earlier this year. Many of these Tamils were taken to Army run
government welfare centers where they were screened for potential
terrorist links and until recently detained until the
Goverment decided conditions for return had improved. This
sparked an outcry within the international community, particularly
in the West and India, and led to pressure on the Sri Lankan Government
to move faster on rates of return, freedom of movement,
access to the camps, and compliance with international standards
set forth by the United Nations, which were endorsed by the
Goverment. Sri Lankan officials told committee staff that they are
eager to resettle all the IDPs, who are costing about 1 million U.S.
dollars a day. But from the Goverment’s perspective, the security
challenges of LTTE cadres hiding among IDPs and the risks of allowing
people to return freely to war-torn areas filled with mines
trumped other short-term considerations.
Due to the onset of the monsoons and ongoing pressure from the
international community, on October 15, the Sri Lankan
Goverment accelerated its resettlement program for IDPs. The goal
was to release about 4,000 people a day from the camps so that the
majority would be resettled before the end of the year. As of December
3, 2009, some 120,740 people remain in the camps, according
to Sri Lankan Goverment figures, and 139,803 people have already
been resettled in Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Mannar,
Trincolmaee, Kilinochchi, and Mullaithivu districts, the latter two
being former LTTE strongholds. At the end of November 2009, the
Goverment announced plans to close the controversial camps by
January 31, 2010, and all IDPs were granted freedom of movement
starting on December 1, 2009. This was a significant and welcome
step forward by the Goverment.
According to the Sri Lankan Goverment figures, the Goverment
provides families selected for resettlement with a basic package:
nonfood items, kitchen utensils, agricultural tool kits, 6 months of
dry rations, an initial payment of Rs. 5,000 Sri Lankan rupees
(about $44), a shelter grant of Rs. 25,000 rupees (about $219), roofing
sheets, land preparation cost of Rs. 4,000 rupees per acre
(about $35), provision of rice seed (paddy), fertilizer allocation, and
transportation. Effective December 15, 2009, the Sri Lankan
Goverment plans to increase the shelter grant to 50,000 rupees
($450) to each returning family. $450 is about 25 percent of the average
per capita income in Sri Lanka. While this amount is insufficient
for fully repairing a damaged home, these funds provide a
starting point to make a damaged home livable on a temporary
basis until additional aid or funds can be accessed. Some families
are directly resettled in their places of origin, either returning
home or staying with host families, while others are taken to government-
run transition centers where they are free to come and go
but which lack robust services.
In early November 2009, committee staff traveled to Manik
Farms, the largest of the IDP camps, and Mannar district in the
northwest, as part of a trip arranged by Defense Secretary
Gotabaya Rajapaksa. During the visit to Zones 2 and 3 at Manik
Farms, areas selected by staff without advance notice to the
Goverment, staff met with IDPs and observed living conditions, hygiene
facilities, educational facilities, banking centers, food distribution,
and the release of IDPs. Basic shelter, food, and hygiene
needs were being met, and U.N. agencies had reliable access. The
monsoons pose an enormous challenge to operations because of possible
flooding and difficulty of moving equipment in the mud. IDPs
told staff they were looking forward to returning home, but remain
nervous about what they would find in these war-damaged areas.
Army officials running the camps were complimentary about the
support they received from U.N. organizations such as the World
Food Programme (WFP) and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). But the officers seemed unaware of specific donor
support for these programs, such as the $28.3 million the United
States had given WFP for food aid in the camps. They remain
broadly suspicious of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) because
of negative experiences in the aftermath of the deadly tsunami
in 2004. In the chaos of the devastation, some town and pro-
vincial representatives reported that some international NGOs that
had not worked in Sri Lanka prior to the tsunami wasted funds,
implemented inappropriate projects, and failed to consult with local
communities.
Basic problems still exist. Access to the IDP camps generally has
been heavily restricted and monitored. Tamil and Muslim political
leaders, journalists, and various NGOs, as well as the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), had been denied entry into the
IDP centers and, as a result, there was no free flow of credible information
coming from the camps. The Goverment has begun to
ease some of these restrictions. People are still unable to locate
their relatives, and some potential host families have been dissuaded
by intrusive government screening procedures. There was
no legal basis for the Goverment detention of Tamils in the camps,
according to Minister of Justice Malinda Moragoda. The IDPs’ relief
that the war was over is tempered by disappointment with the
continued security checks and government control over their lives.
Conditions in the North remain dire. Heavy fighting during the
last phases of the war essentially destroyed much of the North, and
it will take time and money to rebuild the shattered infrastructure
and remove the many mines. The Goverment says it has ambitious
reconstruction plans to improve Tamils’ lives in the North, but
since these plans are not yet public, there is no way to verify these
claims. In Mannar district, for example, homes, schools, and shops
were destroyed by fighting and returnees must rely on UNHCR
roofing sheets for basic shelter.
There are reports that the Army and LTTE placed at least 11⁄2
million mines in the Northern Province, an area of 3,340 square
miles, and de-mining remains—by its nature—very slow going and
manually tedious. Although the Army has augmented its de-mining
equipment (flails) to more than twenty, the rate of de-mining is determined
by weather, terrain, and the need to follow machines with
manual de-miners. The Army is using six newly purchased de-mining
machines from Croatia and Slovakia. The Goverment repeatedly
has asked the international community to increase its funding
for de-mining by providing support directly to the Army. The
United States has provided $6.6 million of de-mining funding this
year to four mine action NGOs. Additionally, a November 2009 assessment
of the Army’s needs by U.S. experts may result in recommendations
to provide additional U.S. training and equipment,
totaling up to $2.7 million, according to the U.S. Embassy in
Colombo.
The international community has been pushing hard for open
camps and resettlement based on international humanitarian principles.
In many ways, however, counting the number of IDPs released
from the camps is an incomplete metric because it belies the
grim conditions facing returnees. It also discounts the enormous
challenges of keeping returnees safe from the minefields, although
urgent de-mining needs are not a justification for restricting freedom
of movement.
Numerous government officials shared with committee staff their
frustrations over international pressure for faster release of IDPs
given the challenging conditions for resettlement. They have legitimate
fears that if IDPs are allowed to move freely in the North,
there will be numerous casualties from active mines for which they
will be held accountable. They are also reasonably hesitant to permit
IDPs to return to areas where there are no services and where
frustrations could breed resentment and security threats against
the Goverment. While these concerns are valid, government officials
did not seem to understand the benefit of greater transparency
and partnership with international donors to combat these
challenges together in a robust and constructive way.
Finally, although they are forgotten by most, more than 100,000
Muslims are being housed in IDP camps in the Northwest, mostly
in Puttalam. The LTTE forcibly removed Sri Lanka’s Muslim population
in the North from their homes in 1990, and they have been
living in the camps ever since. Many now want to return home,
and local Muslim leaders have been seeking government assistance
in tracing properties back to original owners because many people
were unable to take their land documents when they fled. Issues
of land registration and ownership between Tamils and Muslims in
the North could complicate repatriation efforts unless serious attention
is paid to these issues.
PROGRESS ON POLITICAL RECONCILIATION
Early Presidential elections are now scheduled for late January
2010, preceding the parliamentary elections scheduled to be held
before April 2010. President Rajapaksa enjoyed immense popularity
among the Sinhalese electorate at the end of the war. He was
seen as the political architect of victory in what many thought was
an unwinnable war, and early elections would be a way for him to
expand his power base in Parliament. While he initially appeared
invincible at the ballot box, mounting economic concerns and the
opposition announcement that it would put forward former Army
commander Gen. Sarath Fonseka as a candidate leave more uncertainty
about the outcome and prospects for political reconciliation.
The big challenge is the unresolved questions around the ethnic
tensions that were at the core of the conflict. The hierarchy of the
LTTE appears to have been destroyed. While few Tamils in Sri
Lanka express any desire to resume violent conflict, some Tamil
political leaders still talk about controlling the North and East. Rumors
abound of plans for Sinhalese colonization of Tamil towns in
the North, such as Kilonochchi, the former administrative center of
the LTTE-controlled ‘‘Vanni.’’ Further, many Sinhalese feel Tamils
do not appreciate the trauma they suffered under the Tamil Tigers,
a group the FBI listed as ‘‘among the most dangerous and deadly
extremists in the world’’ and credited for pioneering the use of suicide
bombers.
There are different options available for political reconciliation
between ethnic groups. Since 1983, there have been several attempts
to find a constitutional accommodation between successive
Sri Lankan Goverments and the advocates of Tamil nationalism
that would lead to greater power-sharing and devolution. For instance,
the 13th and 17th amendments to the Constitution established
provincial councils and sought to decentralize power to them.
These initiatives have not resolved core tensions, and some view
them as out of touch with prevailing political and military realities.
In addition, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress Member of Parliament
M.T. Hasen Ali noted that there is a need for a power-sharing arrangement
that includes the Muslim minority. To date, a definitive
solution to the ethnic problems remains elusive.
A report was recently completed by the All Parties Representative
Committee (APRC), a panel of experts and political leaders
from varied backgrounds appointed by the President to develop a
political proposal for power-sharing and reconstructing political institutions.
These could include devolution of power from the central
government to the provinces, a second house in the Parliament
modeled somewhat after the U.S. Senate, and independent oversight
bodies meant to serve as a check on powerful state institutions.
President Rajapaksa has not shown a preference yet. He has
said he will not tackle any political reform until after Presidential
and parliamentary elections take place in 2010. A political solution
that is broadly acceptable to could also provide the basis for reconciliation
between the embittered ethnic communities.
Many are concerned that Sri Lanka’s Emergency Regulations,
enacted in 1989, are still in place despite the end of the war.
Among many things, the regulations allow for a concentration of
power by moving the head of state function from the Prime Minister
to the President and permit the detention of individuals for
up to 1 year without charge.
Discussions about reconciliation have not fully begun in Sri
Lanka. While the international community is promoting independent
inquiries into what happened in the last moments of the
war, there is little such call in Sri Lanka—yet. There still needs
to be a debate on what reconciliation model to follow or create and
how to link any fact-finding into the reconciliation process.
AN INTIMIDATED MEDIA
Though the war is over, press freedom remains troubling in Sri
Lanka, raising serious concerns about the vitality of its democratic
institutions. According to the 2009 Press Freedom Index of Reporters
Without Borders, Sri Lanka was ranked 162nd out of 175 countries,
alongside countries like Uzbekistan, Somalia, and Burma. In
2009 alone, two journalists were killed—Lasantha Wickramatunga,
editor of The Sunday Leader and freelance writer Puniyamoorthy
Sathiyamoorthy—according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.
There have been numerous documented attacks on journalists
in Sri Lanka, prompting at least thirty journalists to flee the
country. A few journalists remain imprisoned, notably J. S.
Tissainayagam, who was convicted under Sri Lanka’s Prevention of
Terrorism Act (PTA) for writing two articles critical of the Sri
Lankan Army’s conduct against the LTTE in a case the U.S. State
Department says ‘‘appeared to be politically motivated.’’
Committee staff members noted a palpable fear among journalists
and civil society during their recent trip to Sri Lanka. While
some journalists cancelled scheduled meetings with staff for fear of
persecution from the Goverment, committee staff did meet with select
newspaper, magazine, and television journalists, including
bloggers. Although most of the journalists said they are able to
function as independent media, the consensus was that the press
is not truly free. Media representatives noted that the Goverment
did not exercise its control of the press through direct censorship
or a dominant state-run propaganda machine. Since acts of violence
against journalists and cases brought against them varied
greatly and the perpetrators remain at large, reporters and editors
could not predict future actions against them. To avoid violence,
many journalists engage in self-censorship, and many sources were
unwilling to be quoted. For example, journalists pointed to a recent
Ministry of Defense press release that discouraged reporting on the
political ambitions of active duty military, forcing nearly all media
outlets to drop coverage of military members, including former
Army Chief General Fonseka, who is now a Presidential candidate.
Some media representatives insisted the situation was ‘‘not that
bad’’ and most accepted that certain restrictions on the press were
necessary for the Goverment to win the war against the LTTE. In
addition, nearly all of them criticized some aspect of U.S. policy as
interference in domestic issues.
Journalists and political and civil society actors continue to face
difficulties accessing parts of the country, such as the IDP camps
in the North, because of government fears that negative publicity
will fuel the ‘‘LTTE propaganda machine.’’ These fears have blinded
the Sri Lankan authorities to the benefits of having a free
media that could report favorably on the constructive steps the
Goverment has taken since the war’s end. Basil Rajapaksa, President
Rajapaksa’s brother and lead advisor on resettlement in the
North, told committee staff that such restrictions are designed to
protect the privacy of the IDPs. He observed, ‘‘IDPs don’t like
media and the cameras, because they don’t want to be portrayed
in those conditions’’ and that free access would only be granted to
those ‘‘genuinely interested’’ and only those ‘‘that could be truly
trusted.’’ Mr. Rajapaksa also argued that journalists were not singled
out—high ranking police and army officials and members of
the business community have also been imprisoned on terrorism
charges.
CHILD SOLDIERS
The Goverment of Sri Lanka has made good progress toward
eliminating the problem of child soldiers, with expectation that the
cases of the 15 children remaining in the ranks of the Goverment
will be resolved by the end of this year. Many heralded the
Goverment’s effort to address the child soldier issue during staff’s
visit and noted the police investigations on child recruitment. The
Goverment is a state party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, which requires it to take all feasible
measures to prevent recruitment and use of those under 18
by armed groups that are distinct from armed forces of a state, including
the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and
criminalize such practices.
As noted in the State Department’s Incident Report, the LTTE
allegedly forcibly recruited thousands of male and female children,
some as young as 12, into its cadres. Reportedly, in some cases,
parents or children who resisted were beaten or killed. The LTTE
trained the children to use weapons and sent them to the front
lines, according to reports. In close collaboration with UNICEF, the
Goverment has established centers where roughly 500 former
portunities. The expectation is that the children will be reunified
with their families (if they can be found) or released to host families
and then reintegrated into society.
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
The Goverment’s budget suffered from the high cost of fighting
the war. Expensive purchases of war-related equipment and ammunition,
often on longer term contracts and using up valuable foreign
reserves, coupled with a drop in exports due to the global economic
downturn, pushed Sri Lanka to request a $2.6 billion standby
arrangement from the IMF in early 2009 which was approved
in July. Sri Lankans are optimistic that the economy will improve,
but it has been harder to lure foreign investment into the private
sector. The overall defense budget has yet to see any sort of ‘‘peace
dividend.’’ Longer term contracts with foreign suppliers of military
equipment, particularly China, continue to weigh heavily on the
budget, and the military has pushed for an expansion of bases and
personnel in the North. Some contend that a continued high level
of troops is required in the formerly LTTE-held areas to hunt down
remaining LTTE forces, seize hidden caches of weapons, and prevent
any resurgence of violence. At the same time, military and civilian
officials stressed to staff that the bulk of the requested increase
of about 15 percent in the defense budget is due primarily
to the Goverment’s need to pay down military debts incurred during
the final stages of the war.
Sri Lanka’s economy grew relatively well throughout the war
years, and Sri Lankans hope the end of the war will trigger an economic
boom. Sri Lanka averaged 5 percent annual growth in gross
domestic product (GDP) over the last 20 years, and it has a per
capita income of $2,000, the highest in South Asia after the
Maldives. Sri Lanka has developed a strong garment industry,
which constitutes 43 percent of total exports, and still has significant
tea exports. But economic opportunities are distributed unevenly.
The Western Province, where Colombo is located, contributes
almost 50 percent of Sri Lanka’s GDP, while there are fewer
opportunities in other areas, especially the former conflict regions.
The war between the Government of Sri Lanka and LTTE, which
claimed over 70,000 lives since 1983, had an economic component
as many LTTE leaders were from poorer communities. For instance,
leaders in the two brutal Marxist uprisings in the southern
part of Sri Lanka, known as the Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna
(JVP) insurrections, which killed 15,000 in 1971 and 50,000 people
in 1988–89, were driven by economic discontent. Clearly, long-term
stability in Sri Lanka will be dependent on solid and distributed
economic growth.
Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, brother of President
Mahinda Rajapaksa, repeatedly used the Eastern Province as an
example of the Goverment’s demonstrated performance record and
as a model for plans in the North in discussion with the committee
staff. He said he regretted that Sri Lanka was ‘‘poor at propaganda’’
and had failed to explain its actions and intentions to the
international community, especially to the U.S. and the West.
Rajapaksa said the military victory would lead to lasting peace
only if accompanied by economic development in the areas formerly
occupied by the LTTE.
Donors have responded to the war’s end by shifting their portfolios
to the North and East of Sri Lanka. However, there is a
chance that this could breed resentment in the South where there
is still much poverty. While some international donors seemed to
be artfully calibrating their operations in Sri Lanka so as not to
exacerbate underlying tensions, others chose to ignore the conflict
outright. U.S. Goverment assistance has focused on conflict sensitivity
and economic equity among all ethnic groups—Sinhalese,
Tamil, and Muslim—and on addressing the regional economic imbalances
in conflict-affected areas that have been amplified by the
conflict.
World Bank staff in Sri Lanka, including Country Director
Naoko Ishii and Senior Country Economist Claus Pram Astrup,
should be commended on their development of a ‘‘conflict filter to
enhance effectiveness and reduce reputational risks’’ at the concept
design and implementation stages of projects. As laid out in the
World Bank Sri Lanka Country Assistance Strategy Paper 2009–
2012, the filter asks:
• Have sufficiently broad stakeholder consultations been conducted?
• Have adequate impartial grievance mechanisms been established?
• Are project management and administration adequately sensitive
to inter-ethnic issues?
• Are conflict-generated needs adequately identified?
• Have opportunities to strengthen reconciliation and inter-ethnic
trust been adequately identified?
World Bank staff noted that the filter had been a useful engagement
tool. The Asian Development Bank as well as other international
donors factor in conflict though in less formal ways.
However, the IMF does not officially consider conflict sensitivity
at all and almost prides itself on its tunnel focus on financial indicators,
although the IMF’s mandate is macroeconomic stability—
and a key factor to economic stability is resolution of war and conflict.
On July 24, 2009, the IMF approved a $2.6 billion loan to support
the Goverment of Sri Lanka’s ‘‘ambitious program . . . to restore
fiscal and external viability and address the significant reconstruction
needs of the conflict-affected areas, thereby laying the
basis for future higher economic growth.’’ The IMF did not examine
the possible impact of its program on the conflict in Sri Lanka. The
IMF reportedly did not provide its Executive Board with a copy of
the Goverment’s reconstruction program, a program which had not
been shared publicly in Sri Lanka and received no input from civil
society. Though the World Bank consults IMF assessment letters
when it does significant budget support, the IMF did not reciprocate
the consultation and incorporate the results of the World
Bank’s conflict filter.
IMF Resident Representative Koshy Mathai argued that although
the Goverment had used the IMF Letter of Intent as a vehicle
to clarify its own reconstruction plans and humanitarian assistance
and despite IMF staff interest in those issues, it was outside
the IMF’s mandate to have conditionality in political and military
areas. He suggested that other international fora were more appropriate
for addressing those concerns. The first of eight tranches
(roughly $330 million each) of the loan was in the reserves at Central
Bank as prescribed and the second tranche was also approved.
One of the biggest threats facing Sri Lanka’s economy is the loss
of the European Union’s ‘‘GSP Plus’’ trade concessions. Some argue
this would cost the country $150 million a year in trade and thousands
of jobs, although the Sri Lankan Central Bank issued a
statement asserting it would have little impact. The GSP Plus program,
established in 2005, allows Sri Lankan goods a reduction in
EU tariffs which are particularly important in the highly internationally
competitive garment sector which employs thousands of
Sri Lankan women. Last year, EU imports from Sri Lanka under
the program neared $2 billion. The GSP Plus benefit is predicated
on Sri Lanka’s compliance with internationally recognized labor
and human rights standards, including treatment of the IDPs.
Some assert that the EU’s threat of suspension has led to the
Goverment’s recent accelerated release of IDPs and granting of
freedom of movement.
The formation of US policy on Sri Lanka under Obama administration -2
SRI LANKA: RECHARTING U.S. STRATEGY
AFTER THE WAR
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Sri Lanka stands at a critical juncture in its efforts to secure a
lasting peace. After almost three decades of separatist war, on May
17, 2009, the terrorist Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE or
Tamil Tigers) officially conceded defeat. Two days later, Sri Lankan
President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared total victory after government
soldiers killed the Tamil Tigers’ leader, Velupillai
Prabhakaran, and took control of the entire country for the first
time since 1983. With an estimated 70,000 casualties over the
years, it was a bitter and hard-fought victory, one of the few instances
in modern history in which a terrorist group had been defeated
militarily. President Rajapaksa framed the victory as part of
the global fight against terrorism, declaring in a May 19 speech before
Parliament, ‘‘Ending terrorism in Sri Lanka means a victory
for democracy in the world. Sri Lanka has now given a beginning
to the ending of terrorism in the world.’’
The war in Sri Lanka may be over, but the underlying conflict
still simmers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Sri Lanka is not
a post-conflict environment. While the fighting between the Government
and the LTTE may have ended, the reasons for the political
and social conflict (that also gave rise to youth militancy and
armed clash in the 1970s and 1980s) will take time to address.
Those root causes must be tackled soon and with a sense of urgency
to prevent the country from backsliding. Thirty years of violence
have taken a toll on the majority Sinhalese population, giving
rise to a siege mentality toward the ethnic Tamil minority.
For their part, Tamil leaders have not yet made anticipated conciliatory
gestures that might ease government concerns and foster
a genuine dialogue. Some Tamils are wary about the long-term significance
of post-war Sinhalese ‘‘triumphalism’’ and fear that they
may be marginalized in the unified country of Sri Lanka. The
Tamil middle class has been devastated, many having emigrated
years ago, leaving behind few mainstream leaders to represent
more moderate views. The situation is particularly dire for Tamils
in the North, who are trapped between living in government-run
camps and returning to homes destroyed in the war.
Real peace will not come overnight to Sri Lanka and cannot be
imposed from the outside. The country has endured decades of
trauma, and a generation of politicians and laymen know little
aside fromwar and conflict as the norm. It will take time for the
country to make the transition to a post-conflict environment amid
ongoing political and economic challenges. The country’s economy
remains fragile, requiring the International Monetary Fund to provide
a $2.6 billion loan to bolster Sri Lanka’s reserves. Government
officials have been under additional pressure as a result of the European
Union’s deliberations to suspend special trade preferences
with Sri Lanka, known as ‘‘GSP Plus,’’ unless progress is made on
human rights and political freedoms.
The political environment in Sri Lanka is not as black and white
as many outside observers believe. Despite ongoing allegations of
war crimes and human rights abuses, the Rajapaksa Goverment
has taken some positive steps to ease the humanitarian crisis in
the North, develop the East, and reduce the number of child soldiers.
Its recent announcement to allow increased freedom of movement
in the government-run camps for internally displaced persons
(IDPs) starting December 1, 2009, and shut down the camps by
January 31, 2010, is positive and welcome. The Government still
faces many legitimate obstacles in the North—such as removing
the extensive mines left by years of warfare—where the international
community can be an active partner in promoting faster
resettlement.
Serious questions remain about the Sri Lankan Goverment’s
ability to address pressing reconstruction and development needs
for Tamils and Muslims. The Government’s prolonged application
of emergency laws, lack of transparency in developing a strategy
for reconstruction and resettlement, questionable conduct during
the war, and clampdown on press freedom have undermined trust
and the prospects for greater partnership with international donors.
Though the war is over, a culture of fear and paranoia permeates
society, especially for journalists, which further erodes Sri
Lanka’s standing in the international community and hampers its
prospects for genuine peace.
The final stages of the war captured the attention of governments
around the world, particularly the United States. The
Obama administration has been focusing on the humanitarian crisis
in the North and pressing the Sri Lankan Government to take
meaningful steps toward political reconciliation and press freedom.
The United States is one of the largest donors of humanitarian aid
to Sri Lanka, including food aid and de-mining assistance.
Yet, in Colombo, the Goverment considers the bilateral relationship
with Washington to be on a downward trajectory. Most U.S.
criticisms of Sri Lankan actions at the end of the war and treatment
of IDPs have fallen on deaf ears, with Sri Lankan authorities
dismissing the U.S. posture as ‘‘no carrots and all sticks.’’ U.S. assistance
to Sri Lanka, although delivered in grants and not loans,
has attracted criticism from the Rajapaksa Goverment for its emphasis
on political reform. This growing rift in U.S.-Sri Lanka relations
can be seen in Colombo’s realignment toward non-Western
countries, who offer an alternative model of development that
places greater value on security over freedoms.
Indeed, Sri Lanka’s geopolitical position has evolved considerably.
As Western countries became increasingly critical of the Sri
Lankan Government’s handling of the war and human rights
record, the Rajapaksa leadership cultivated ties with such countries
as Burma, China, Iran, and Libya. The Chinese have invested
billions of dollars in Sri Lanka through military loans, infrastructure
loans, and port development, with none of the strings attached
by Western nations. While the United States shares with the Indi-
ans and the Chinese a common interest in securing maritime trade
routes through the Indian Ocean, the U.S. Government has invested
relatively little in the economy or the security sector in Sri
Lanka, instead focusing more on IDPs and civil society. As a result,
Sri Lanka has grown politically and economically isolated from the
West.
This strategic drift will have consequences for U.S. interests in
the region. Along with our legitimate humanitarian and political
concerns, U.S. policymakers have tended to underestimate Sri
Lanka’s geostrategic importance for American interests. Sri Lanka
is located at the nexus of crucial maritime trading routes in the Indian
Ocean connecting Europe and the Middle East to China and
the rest of Asia. The United States, India, and China all share an
interest in deterring terrorist activity and curbing piracy that could
disrupt maritime trade. Security considerations extend beyond sealanes
to the stability of India, the world’s largest democracy. Communal
tensions in Sri Lanka have the potential to undermine stability
in India, particularly in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu,
home to 60 million Tamils. All of these concerns should be part of
our bilateral relationship.
The United States cannot afford to ‘‘lose’’ Sri Lanka. This does
not mean changing the relationship overnight or ignoring the real
concerns about Sri Lanka’s political and humanitarian record. It
does mean, however, considering a new approach that increases
U.S. leverage vis-a-vis Sri Lanka by expanding the number of tools
at our disposal. A more multifaceted U.S. strategy would capitalize
on the economic, trade, and security aspects of the relationship.
This approach in turn could catalyze much-needed political reforms
that will ultimately help secure longer term U.S. strategic interests
in the Indian Ocean. U.S. strategy should also invest in Sinhalese
parts of the country, instead of just focusing aid on the Tamil-dominated
North and East.
The Obama administration is currently weighing a new strategy
for relations with Sri Lanka. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
has closely followed events on the ground this year, including
a hearing in February and a staff trip to Sri Lanka in November.
In an effort to stimulate a larger debate on U.S. policy toward
Sri Lanka, the committee staff prepared this bipartisan report examining
recent developments and proposing recommendations for
U.S. policy towards Sri Lanka. The recommendations include a
broader and more robust U.S. approach to Sri Lanka that appreciates
new political and economic realities in Sri Lanka and U.S.
geostrategic interests; continuation of de-mining efforts in the
North; and promotion of people-to-people reconciliation programs
throughout the country.
AFTER THE WAR
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Sri Lanka stands at a critical juncture in its efforts to secure a
lasting peace. After almost three decades of separatist war, on May
17, 2009, the terrorist Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE or
Tamil Tigers) officially conceded defeat. Two days later, Sri Lankan
President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared total victory after government
soldiers killed the Tamil Tigers’ leader, Velupillai
Prabhakaran, and took control of the entire country for the first
time since 1983. With an estimated 70,000 casualties over the
years, it was a bitter and hard-fought victory, one of the few instances
in modern history in which a terrorist group had been defeated
militarily. President Rajapaksa framed the victory as part of
the global fight against terrorism, declaring in a May 19 speech before
Parliament, ‘‘Ending terrorism in Sri Lanka means a victory
for democracy in the world. Sri Lanka has now given a beginning
to the ending of terrorism in the world.’’
The war in Sri Lanka may be over, but the underlying conflict
still simmers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Sri Lanka is not
a post-conflict environment. While the fighting between the Government
and the LTTE may have ended, the reasons for the political
and social conflict (that also gave rise to youth militancy and
armed clash in the 1970s and 1980s) will take time to address.
Those root causes must be tackled soon and with a sense of urgency
to prevent the country from backsliding. Thirty years of violence
have taken a toll on the majority Sinhalese population, giving
rise to a siege mentality toward the ethnic Tamil minority.
For their part, Tamil leaders have not yet made anticipated conciliatory
gestures that might ease government concerns and foster
a genuine dialogue. Some Tamils are wary about the long-term significance
of post-war Sinhalese ‘‘triumphalism’’ and fear that they
may be marginalized in the unified country of Sri Lanka. The
Tamil middle class has been devastated, many having emigrated
years ago, leaving behind few mainstream leaders to represent
more moderate views. The situation is particularly dire for Tamils
in the North, who are trapped between living in government-run
camps and returning to homes destroyed in the war.
Real peace will not come overnight to Sri Lanka and cannot be
imposed from the outside. The country has endured decades of
trauma, and a generation of politicians and laymen know little
aside fromwar and conflict as the norm. It will take time for the
country to make the transition to a post-conflict environment amid
ongoing political and economic challenges. The country’s economy
remains fragile, requiring the International Monetary Fund to provide
a $2.6 billion loan to bolster Sri Lanka’s reserves. Government
officials have been under additional pressure as a result of the European
Union’s deliberations to suspend special trade preferences
with Sri Lanka, known as ‘‘GSP Plus,’’ unless progress is made on
human rights and political freedoms.
The political environment in Sri Lanka is not as black and white
as many outside observers believe. Despite ongoing allegations of
war crimes and human rights abuses, the Rajapaksa Goverment
has taken some positive steps to ease the humanitarian crisis in
the North, develop the East, and reduce the number of child soldiers.
Its recent announcement to allow increased freedom of movement
in the government-run camps for internally displaced persons
(IDPs) starting December 1, 2009, and shut down the camps by
January 31, 2010, is positive and welcome. The Government still
faces many legitimate obstacles in the North—such as removing
the extensive mines left by years of warfare—where the international
community can be an active partner in promoting faster
resettlement.
Serious questions remain about the Sri Lankan Goverment’s
ability to address pressing reconstruction and development needs
for Tamils and Muslims. The Government’s prolonged application
of emergency laws, lack of transparency in developing a strategy
for reconstruction and resettlement, questionable conduct during
the war, and clampdown on press freedom have undermined trust
and the prospects for greater partnership with international donors.
Though the war is over, a culture of fear and paranoia permeates
society, especially for journalists, which further erodes Sri
Lanka’s standing in the international community and hampers its
prospects for genuine peace.
The final stages of the war captured the attention of governments
around the world, particularly the United States. The
Obama administration has been focusing on the humanitarian crisis
in the North and pressing the Sri Lankan Government to take
meaningful steps toward political reconciliation and press freedom.
The United States is one of the largest donors of humanitarian aid
to Sri Lanka, including food aid and de-mining assistance.
Yet, in Colombo, the Goverment considers the bilateral relationship
with Washington to be on a downward trajectory. Most U.S.
criticisms of Sri Lankan actions at the end of the war and treatment
of IDPs have fallen on deaf ears, with Sri Lankan authorities
dismissing the U.S. posture as ‘‘no carrots and all sticks.’’ U.S. assistance
to Sri Lanka, although delivered in grants and not loans,
has attracted criticism from the Rajapaksa Goverment for its emphasis
on political reform. This growing rift in U.S.-Sri Lanka relations
can be seen in Colombo’s realignment toward non-Western
countries, who offer an alternative model of development that
places greater value on security over freedoms.
Indeed, Sri Lanka’s geopolitical position has evolved considerably.
As Western countries became increasingly critical of the Sri
Lankan Government’s handling of the war and human rights
record, the Rajapaksa leadership cultivated ties with such countries
as Burma, China, Iran, and Libya. The Chinese have invested
billions of dollars in Sri Lanka through military loans, infrastructure
loans, and port development, with none of the strings attached
by Western nations. While the United States shares with the Indi-
ans and the Chinese a common interest in securing maritime trade
routes through the Indian Ocean, the U.S. Government has invested
relatively little in the economy or the security sector in Sri
Lanka, instead focusing more on IDPs and civil society. As a result,
Sri Lanka has grown politically and economically isolated from the
West.
This strategic drift will have consequences for U.S. interests in
the region. Along with our legitimate humanitarian and political
concerns, U.S. policymakers have tended to underestimate Sri
Lanka’s geostrategic importance for American interests. Sri Lanka
is located at the nexus of crucial maritime trading routes in the Indian
Ocean connecting Europe and the Middle East to China and
the rest of Asia. The United States, India, and China all share an
interest in deterring terrorist activity and curbing piracy that could
disrupt maritime trade. Security considerations extend beyond sealanes
to the stability of India, the world’s largest democracy. Communal
tensions in Sri Lanka have the potential to undermine stability
in India, particularly in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu,
home to 60 million Tamils. All of these concerns should be part of
our bilateral relationship.
The United States cannot afford to ‘‘lose’’ Sri Lanka. This does
not mean changing the relationship overnight or ignoring the real
concerns about Sri Lanka’s political and humanitarian record. It
does mean, however, considering a new approach that increases
U.S. leverage vis-a-vis Sri Lanka by expanding the number of tools
at our disposal. A more multifaceted U.S. strategy would capitalize
on the economic, trade, and security aspects of the relationship.
This approach in turn could catalyze much-needed political reforms
that will ultimately help secure longer term U.S. strategic interests
in the Indian Ocean. U.S. strategy should also invest in Sinhalese
parts of the country, instead of just focusing aid on the Tamil-dominated
North and East.
The Obama administration is currently weighing a new strategy
for relations with Sri Lanka. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
has closely followed events on the ground this year, including
a hearing in February and a staff trip to Sri Lanka in November.
In an effort to stimulate a larger debate on U.S. policy toward
Sri Lanka, the committee staff prepared this bipartisan report examining
recent developments and proposing recommendations for
U.S. policy towards Sri Lanka. The recommendations include a
broader and more robust U.S. approach to Sri Lanka that appreciates
new political and economic realities in Sri Lanka and U.S.
geostrategic interests; continuation of de-mining efforts in the
North; and promotion of people-to-people reconciliation programs
throughout the country.
The formation of US policy on Sri Lanka under Obama administration -1
SRI LANKA: RECHARTING U.S. STRATEGY
AFTER THE WAR
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DECEMBER 7, 2009
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
BARBARA BOXER, California
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania
JIM WEBB, Virginia
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
BOB CORKER, Tennessee
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JIM DEMINT, South Carolina
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DAVID MCKean, Staff Director
KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC, December 7, 2009.
DEAR COLLEAGUES: The administration is currently evaluating
U.S. policy toward Sri Lanka in the wake of the military defeat of
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), one of the world’s
deadliest terrorist groups.
It has been six months since the end of the war, and the Sri
Lankan Government is dealing with a humanitarian crisis in the
North where hundreds of thousands are still displaced and homes
and infrastructure are destroyed. The Government faces many
challenges in transitioning to peace, and the international community
can help.
Sri Lanka is an important partner and friend to the United
States, so we asked two of our Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(SFRC) staff members, Fatema Z. Sumar and Nilmini Gunaratne
Rubin, to evaluate U.S. policy towards Sri Lanka. Ms. Sumar and
Ms. Rubin traveled to Sri Lanka with the extensive support of the
American Embassy in Colombo and the Sri Lankan Embassy in
Washington, DC, to conduct a week-long fact finding mission November
2–7, 2009, to see firsthand how the country was
transitioning after the war. They met dozens of government officials,
opposition party leaders, non-governmental organizations,
journalists, international donors, foreign diplomats, academics, civil
society leaders, business people, internally displaced persons
(IDPs), and Sri Lankan citizens in a variety of settings. In addition
to Colombo, they traveled throughout the country, including visiting
the IDP camps in the North, viewing demining activities in
the Northwest, seeing areas rebuilt after the December 2004 tsunami
and fighting in the East, and meeting local government officials
in the South.
Their report provides significant insight and a number of important
recommendations to advance U.S. policy in Sri Lanka. We
hope it will help stimulate debate on the nature of the U.S.-Sri
Lanka relationship and American interests in South Asia.
Sincerely,
JOHN F. KERRY,
Chairman.
RICHARD G. LUGAR
Ranking Member.
AFTER THE WAR
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DECEMBER 7, 2009
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
BARBARA BOXER, California
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania
JIM WEBB, Virginia
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
BOB CORKER, Tennessee
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JIM DEMINT, South Carolina
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DAVID MCKean, Staff Director
KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC, December 7, 2009.
DEAR COLLEAGUES: The administration is currently evaluating
U.S. policy toward Sri Lanka in the wake of the military defeat of
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), one of the world’s
deadliest terrorist groups.
It has been six months since the end of the war, and the Sri
Lankan Government is dealing with a humanitarian crisis in the
North where hundreds of thousands are still displaced and homes
and infrastructure are destroyed. The Government faces many
challenges in transitioning to peace, and the international community
can help.
Sri Lanka is an important partner and friend to the United
States, so we asked two of our Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(SFRC) staff members, Fatema Z. Sumar and Nilmini Gunaratne
Rubin, to evaluate U.S. policy towards Sri Lanka. Ms. Sumar and
Ms. Rubin traveled to Sri Lanka with the extensive support of the
American Embassy in Colombo and the Sri Lankan Embassy in
Washington, DC, to conduct a week-long fact finding mission November
2–7, 2009, to see firsthand how the country was
transitioning after the war. They met dozens of government officials,
opposition party leaders, non-governmental organizations,
journalists, international donors, foreign diplomats, academics, civil
society leaders, business people, internally displaced persons
(IDPs), and Sri Lankan citizens in a variety of settings. In addition
to Colombo, they traveled throughout the country, including visiting
the IDP camps in the North, viewing demining activities in
the Northwest, seeing areas rebuilt after the December 2004 tsunami
and fighting in the East, and meeting local government officials
in the South.
Their report provides significant insight and a number of important
recommendations to advance U.S. policy in Sri Lanka. We
hope it will help stimulate debate on the nature of the U.S.-Sri
Lanka relationship and American interests in South Asia.
Sincerely,
JOHN F. KERRY,
Chairman.
RICHARD G. LUGAR
Ranking Member.
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